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MORTGAGES AND TRUST DEEDS FORECLOSURE
FAILURE TO PROVE DEFICIENCY AGAINST

-

RECEIVERMORTGAGOR'S

ESTATE-Wright vs. Halley-No. 13226-Decided May 28,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Where mortgaged property was sold on foreclosure, leaving a deficiency, which deficiency was not proved as a claim against the estate of
the deceased mortgagor, and where the foreclosure itself was not begun
during the estate year, as provided in Sec. 5344, C. L. 1921, it was
error to appoint a receiver of the foreclosed property to impound the
rents thereof and apply them on such deficiency, since the rents belonged
to the estate which had not been made liable for the deficency.--Judgment reversed with directions.

ADOPTION-NOTICE--VENUE-WHO MAY ATTACK ADOPTION DECREE-INHERITANCE IN DUAL CAPACITY-Wilson vs. Wilson
-No. 13528-Decided May 28, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
1. Notice of the pendency of adoption proceedings need not be
given to a person having temporary custody of a minor child, where
both the natural parents are dead and no guardian has been appointed.
2. The adoption proceeding may be brought in a county other
than that of the minor's residence.
3. The action of the adopting parent, in accepting the adoption
decree as binding on himself, precludes his heirs from an attack on its
validity.
4. A minor, whose parents are dead and who has become the
adopted son of his grandfather, may inherit from*the grandfather both
as adopted son and as grandchild.--Judgmentaffirmed.

SHERIFFS -

BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS -

JURISDICTION

OVER JAIL-Richart vs. The Board of County Commissioners of
the County of Boulder, Colorado-No. 13506-Decided May
28, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County obtained
a judgment removing George A. Richart from occupying as living quarters certain rooms in the building used as a county courthouse and jail
in Boulder, and restraining him from making use of such rooms not
authorized by the Board of County Commissioners.
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1. The general powers conferred upon the Board of County
Commissioners with reference to the county's property, when in conflict
with the special powers conferred upon the sheriff with reference to
jails, must yield to the latter.
2. The statutes of Colorado impose upon the sheriff of the
county the charge and custody of a jail and of the prisoners confined
therein and the sheriff is responsible for the manner in which the jail is
kept, and must see that it is kept clean, safe and wholesome, and must
feed the prisoners and must prevent escapes and must make reasonable
arrangements for conferences between prisoners and their attorneys,
assuming care in so doing so as to prevent escape.
3. The sheriff is entitled to occupy room or rooms in the jail for
himself and his family in order to carry into effect the statutory provisions and the Board of County Commissioners is without authority to
forbid the sheriff to occupy the room or rooms as living quarters.
4. The sheriff is entitled to occupy such quarters in the jail for
himself and his family as may be necessary to properly safeguard prisoners.-Judgment reversed.

BUILDING

AND

LOAN

ASSOCIATIONS

-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

RIGHT OF THE COMMISSIONER TO TAKE POSSESSION-United

States Bldg. and Loan Assn. vs. McClelland as State Commissioner
-No.
13451-Decided June 9, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
This case was brought here for review of a judgment entered by
the District Court of Denver denying an injunction against the Commissioner of Building and Loan Associations from taking possession of
the plaintiff's property.
1. That section of the building and loan code denying a receivership in building and loan associations cannot be attacked by the association. Creditors or shareholders can only raise this question.
2. An attack cannot be made upon that section of the building
and loan code giving the commissioner the right to disaffirm certain
contracts where no attempt or threat to exercise that right is shown.
3. An attack cannot be made upon that section of the building
and loan code giving the commissioner the right to take forcible possession with the aid of a sheriff where no such situation has arisen.
4. The regulations provided for in Article 8 of Chapter 47,
Session Laws 1933, under the building and loan code are similar to the
regulation of banks and the taking over of a building and loan association by the commissioner under Section 9 is free from any of the constitutional objections raised by the plaintiff in this case.
5. Building and loan associations are purely the creatures of
statute.
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6. The interests of those who may be affected are safeguarded
by provisions for judicial inquiry.
7. The constitutionality of the statute is presumed, especially
where the law has been enacted in the exercise of the police power, and
its unconstitutionality must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.Judgment affirmed.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-USE OF REMEDY TO DECLARE AN INITIATED MEASURE VALID AND A LEGISLATIVE ACT VOID-

REAPPORTIONMENT-Armstrong, Secretary of State vs. Mitten
et al.-No. 13553-Decided July 2, 1934--Opinionby Mr. Justice Butler.
This is a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Act. The
petitioners sought to have the Reapportionment Act initiated by the
people and appearing in Session Laws of 1933 as chapter 157, declared
valid, and to have a legislative act appearing in the same Session Laws
as chapter 156, declared void. Both acts relate to legislative reapportionment. The trial court upheld the contention of the petitioners.
1. The people have power to adopt an initiated reapportionment.
2. The initiated act went into full force and effect on the date of
its adoption by the people.
3. The title of the initiated act was sufficient under the constitution.
4. The mere fact that the initiated act has produced confusion
and uncertainty with reference to the election of senators in some districts is an insufficient objection.
5. The initiated act is not open to any of the constitutional objections urged against it.
6. The legislative act in question is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.--Judgment affirmed.

CONTRACTS--CANCELLATION--SUFFICIENCY

OF COMPLAINT-DE-

MURER--Gregg Vs. Green--No. 13345-Decided July 2, 1934
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
In a suit seeking cancellation of an agreement relative to land,
defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Plaintiff elected
to stand on his complaint and suffer judgment of dismissal. Error is
assigned.
1. Where the complaint alleges that the defendant is insolvent
and that the defendant does not intend to comply with the terms of the
contract and the breaches alleged are inconsistent with that intention to
be bound by its terms, equitable rescission is a proper remedy.
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2. Where damages for breach of contract would be difficult or
impossible to determine or inadequate, the injured party may resort to
the equitable remedy of rescission.
3. Where the contract contains no forfeiture clause but where it
is alleged that the defendant has been guilty of waste, equity may be
invoked and cancellation ordered.--Judgment reversed.

CRIMES-FALSE PRETENSES--CONFIDENCE GAME-Chilton et al. vs.
The People-No. 13452-Decided July 2, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
An information was filed against plaintiffs in error charging them
in one count with false pretenses and in another count with confidence
game. At the trial the district attorney withdrew the false pretenses
count and defendants moved for a directed verdict on the confidence
game count. The jury convicted them on the confidence game count
and they were duly sentenced.
1. Statements of opinion or estimates or promises are not actionable and provide no basis for prosecution for obtaining property by
false pretenses.
2. The withdrawal of the charge of obtaining property by false
pretenses amounted to an acquittal of the false or fraudulent pretense
charge insofar as that offense is set out in the definition of confidence
game.
3. To sustain a charge of confidence game in this case something
more than mere words, however false and fraudulent, is necessary to
constitute the swindling operation essential in the confidence game.Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Chief Justice Adars
dissent.
LIFE INSURANCE - REINSTATEMENT Op LAPSED POLICY AFTER
DEATH--Colorado Life Co. vs. Winegarner-No. 13349-Decided July 2, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Mrs. Winegarner sued to recover from the insurance company on
a life and accident insurance policy which was issued by the company
to her husband and in which she was beneficiary. Verdict and judgment for $2,000 were in her favor and the company seeks reversal.
1. The statutes do not require an insurance company to reinstate a policy which has lapsed.
2. The right to reinstatement must be determined from the
terms of the policy itself.
3. Where the application for reinstatement contains false statements as to the health of the insured and the company reinstates without knowledge thereof, such reinstatement is void.
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Where the company reinstated the policy after the insured's

death but without knowledge of his death and the policy provided for
reinstatement only while the insured was living, such reinstatement is
not effective.
5. It is error to admit statements of a soliciting agent of an insurance company concerning his own authority to effect a reinstatement.
An agent's authority cannot be established by proof of his own statement in relation thereto.
6. Where the evidence shows that the insured delayed reinstating
the policy until a mortal disease had overtaken him, and where the
application for reinstatement was not approved until after his death,
and the application concealed facts as to his health, judgment cannot be
sustained in favor of the beneficiary.--Judgment reversed.

RAILROADS--PERSONAL INJURIES-MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT-VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE-The Denver and

Salt Lake Railway Co. vs. Bedard-No. 13255-Decided July
2, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Plaintiff below sued the company for $50,000 damages which he
alleged he sustained in a collision between a railway motor car on
which, as the company section foreman, he was riding, and the company's work train. A jury awarded plaintiff over $17,000. At the
conclusion of the case the court overruled the company's motion for a
directed verdict.
1. The plaintiff could recover only on proof of the company's
negligence.
2. The company, in operating its work train, was not obliged
to keep a lookout for its foreman. It was the plaintiff's duty to keep
out of the way of the train.
3. The interpretation of written orders given for the movement
of trains over track are for the court.
4. There is no evidence of the company's negligence.--Judgment
reversed.
OUSTER-COLORADO
TAX COMMISSION-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT OUSTER FROM OFFICE-The People vs.

Tucker-No. 13121-Decided July 2, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Celsus P. Link, plaintiff in error, and one Morgan and one Seaman
were members of the Colorado Tax Commission. Morgan preferred
charges of numerous acts of official misconduct against Link and on a
hearing the Civil Service Commission removed Link from office. The
name of Sheldon E. Tucker was certified to fill the vacancy and he was
appointed. In an action brought by Link in the District Court, he
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alleged that such Civil Service Commission acted without sufficient evidence, exceeded its jurisdiction, grossly abused its discretion, and prayed

for judgment of ouster against Tucker.
The court below sustained the action of the Civil Service Commission and Link assigns error.

1.

Allegations in a complaint that the State Civil Service Com-

mission exceeded its jurisdiction, grossly abused its discretion, and acted
without sufficient evidence, gives a right of review by the court.

2.

Public official is presumed to act honestly, faithfully and effi-

ciently, and the burden of proof that he has failed to do so is upon the

one who seeks to oust him.
3.
It was the duty of the Civil Service Commission to make definite findings of fact and in this case there were no such definite findings
made. Legal conclusions of the Commission are in no sense findings of
fact.
4. Omissions of definite findings by the Civil Service Commission cannot be cured by the evidence.
5. The charge of insubordination is not sustained.

6.

Intemperate language is not sufficient for removal.

7. The evidence was wholly insufficient to sustain a removal on
the ground of inefficiency or for the good of the service.---Judgment
reversed.
MANDAMUS--CIVIL

SERVICE

COMMISSION

EXPENSES-ADEQUATE

REMEDY AT LAW--Schneider et al. vs. The People, on Relationi

of W. W. Grant, Jr. et al.-No. 13496-Decided July 9, 1934
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
The District Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus at the
instance of the relators, W. W. Grant, Jr., James W. Kelley and Edgar
McComb, as members of the Civil Service Commission of Denver, commanding the mayor and council either to appropriate forthwith $2,000
for the Commission's expenses in addition to the appropriation of
$2,650 made for that purpose. The evidence was taken and the alternative writ was made permanent except that the additional sum so
ordered to be appropriated was reduced from $2,000 to $1,740.
The budget submitted by the Civil Service Commission was for
$4,300, which includes the secretary's salary of $2,400 and estimated
expenses for clerks' supplies, etc. The city appropriated $2,560, leaving the $2,400 for the secretary's salary and $160 for incidental expenses.
1. Writ of mandamus lies only when on the one side there, is a
clear legal right to demand the doing of a certain thing, and on the
other side a clear legal duty to do it.
2. Where the charter makes it the duty of the City Council to
provide for the payment of necessary expenses in carrying out the 'work
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of the Civil Service Commission the city is liable for such necessary
expenses, and should the city refuse to pay the same, those entitled to
compensation could recover judgment. Such a remedy would be adequate and where there exists an adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of law, mandamus will not lie.--4udgment reversed. Mr. Justice Butler specially concurring. Mr. Justice Campbell not participating.
COLLATERAL ATTACK - The Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Board of County Commis-

TAXATION--JUDGMENTS

sioners of Fremont County et al.-No. 13352-Decided July 9,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The railroad company sued the County Commissioners and School
District of Fremont County to recover taxes paid in 1932 for the taxes
of 1931, it being contended that the tax levy was illegal. The trial
court sustained the defendants' demurrers on the ground of defect of
parties, that is, the absence of the State of Colorado, and dismissed the
case.
The school district had over $100,000 of outstanding warrants
and the school district and one Grigsby and a bank that held most of
the warrants agreed upon a scheme whereby a suit was brought by a
dummy secured by Grigsby to recover $140,000 from the district on
the theory that the plaintiff was the owner of warrants totaling
$135,000, and an answer was immediately filed admitting the allegations, consenting to the entry of judgment for approximately $141,000
and two days thereafter the dummy brought an action in mandamus
against the district to compel tax levy to pay the judgment, and immediately the district consented to entry of judgment and judgment was
entered compelling the district to levy a property tax sufficient to produce a certain amount annually for the next twenty years to pay off the
judgment.
The judgment further ordered the issuance to the plaintiff of judgment bonds to represent the money judgment, and bonds aggregating
$140,000 were issued and delivered and the judgment satisfied. Grigsby
sold all of the bonds to the State of Colorado through its land board
and Grigsby received $7,000 for his services, and the proceeds of the
sale went back to the school district.
1. It is contended that the judgment bonds are void for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction to order the issuance of judgment
bonds; that the bonds were issued without a vote of the qualified electors; that they raised the district bonded indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit, but the judgment in the mandamus suit ordered the
district to pay, not the bonds, but the money judgment, and the levy
of taxes was made pursuant thereto.
2. It is claimed that the money judgment and a mandamus
judgment constitute a fraud upon the taxpayers, but in this case the
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judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, and even if the judgment was obtained by fraud
or collusion, it is voidable only and is binding upon the parties until
set aside in a direct proceeding.
3. A judgment against a county and its legal representatives includes not only the parties named as defendants but also all the citizens
of the county not so named.
4. The action in this case was a collateral attack upon a judgment wherein the court below had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties and the only way such judgment could be attacked was by
direct proceedings. In the present case the plaintiff below appeared and
petitioned the court to set aside the judgment, and failing to obtain
relief, instead of bringing that case here for review, the plaintiff commenced the present suit to recover the tax paid in 1932 on the ground
that the tax levy was illegal. This second suit was a collateral attack
upon the money judgment and the mandamus judgment and such
attack cannot succeed.
5. The judgment for money and the mandamus judgment is
binding upon the school district and its taxpayers unless and until it is
set aside in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose.-Judgment
affirmed. Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Chief Justice Adams and Mr. Justice
Campbell dissent.

AUTOMOBILES-COLLISION-DIRECTED
NEGLIGENCE-INSTRUCTIONS--The

VERDICT-CONTRIBUTORY

Weicker Transfer and Stor-

age Co. vs. Bedwell-No. 13151-Decided July 9, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.

Bedwell obtained in the District Court a verdict and a judgment

for $15,000 growing out of an automobile collision on the Colorado

Springs highway between Denver and Colorado Springs, between a

truck of the defendant and a coupe in which the plaintiff was riding as
a passenger. The plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries including
the loss of a leg.
1. The District Court was right in refusing to direct a verdict
for the company. Under the evidence the question of negligence was
for the jury.
2. There was no error in declining to instruct on contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. There was no evidence to support a charge
of contributory negligence.
3. The court properly submitted to the jury the question of ex-

cessive speed in operating the truck.

4. The court properly submitted to the jury as to whether or
not the defendant's truck was without headlights.

5.

It was not necessary to instruct the jury that if they believe

that the testimony of any witness is contrary to or inconsistent with
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the physical facts, that such physical facts should control such matters.
This is more in the province of argument of counsel, and the parties
are not entitled to such instructions as a matter of law.
6. Refusal of the court to admit an exhibit is cured by a later
ruling of the court admitting all exhibits.
7. Denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial was within
the sound discretion of the trial court.--Judgment affirmed.

PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-REAL PARTY IN INTER-

EST--Gates vs. Hepp--No. 13260-Decided July 9, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
Gates sued Hepp and two others to recover on certain promissory
notes executed and delivered under a written contract. Hepp is the only

defendant brought into court. His general demurrer to the third
amended complaint was sustained. The plaintiff stood upon that complaint and a judgment of dismissal was entered.

1. The evidence show$ that Gates was not the real party in interest in view of the fact that the persons whom he represented as trustee
intervened in the action and became parties to the action and as none of
these parties prosecuted error the real parties in interest are not before
the court.
2. The contract sued on shows that at the time the contract was
made by the plaintiff the intervenors whom he represented did not
assume any obligations or make any promises. Hence, the contract was
unilateral and lacked mutuality and is, therefore, unenforcible.--Judgment affirmed.
WATERS-TITLE TO-BURDEN OF PROOF-Datiset al. vs. Hurt-

No. 12942-Decided July 9, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Hurt obtained an injunction against the defendants in the court
below enjoining and restraining them from in any manner diverting or
taking any water from the J. D. Ward ditch No. 2, to be applied to a
certain eighty-acre tract.
Belle Sanderson was the original owner of the J. D. Ward ditch
No. 2 and defendants claim, through her, by mesne conveyances.
Plaintiff claims that she orally contracted with plaintiff's remote
grantor, J. D. Ward, under which supposed agreement Mrs. Sanderson
parted first with all ditch and water rights in the Ward No. 2 ditch to
irrigate this eighty-acre tract.
1. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish her
title to the water and the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of her
own title rather than upon the supposed weaknesses of her adversaries.
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2. The evidence showed that Mrs. Sanderson and Judge Ward,
pioneer settlers, were merely parties to a neighborly arrangement whereby the latter could use the ditch and water when the former would not
need it and when such use would not interfere with her own rights.
3. Such evidence was insufficient to establish any waiver or forfeiture of the ditch and water rights of Mrs. Sanderson, through whom
the defendants claim title.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -

EMPLOYEE

-

INDEPENDENT

CON-

TRACTOR-London Guarantee and Accident Company et at. vs.
Industrial Commission of Colorado et aL.-No. 13521-Decided
July 16, 1934--Opinioy by Mr. Justice Bouck.
The Commission awarded compensation to the widow of one
Rowland, who was killed while engaged in removing a water tank
from the premises of a lumber company, under a written contract with
the lumber company, whereby the company sold the tank to Rowland
and Boyd and Rowland and Boyd agreed to remove the tank at their
own expense and to release the lumber company from any liability
whatsoever from any damages that might be suffered in the removal.
The District Court affirmed the award.
1. Under the facts in this case, Rowland was an independent
contractor and not an employee. There is no semblance of wages involved and the right to discharge and the right to quit are both absent.
2. While the finding of the Commission that one is an employee
is generally conclusive, yet such finding must be substantially supported
by the evidence and where there is a total lack of such evidence, such
finding is not binding.-Judgmentreversed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -

EMPLOYEE

-

INDEPENDENT

CON-

TRACTOR-The State Compensation Insurance Fund et at. vs.
The Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 1354 1-Decided
July 16, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
The only question involved is whether claimant was an employee
of the State Brokerage and Manufacturing Company in whose service
claimant was injured. It operated a series of ice depots in Pueblo under
name of Arctic Ice Company and placed claimant in charge of a depot
operated under its name and had claimant carry its name upon his truck
and claimant was paid by receiving the difference between a price fixed
by the company and the retail price of ice sold.
1. A person operating an ice depot for a company and receiving
no fixed wage but getting his compensation from the difference between
the price of ice fixed by the company and the retail price, and where the
company retains the right to hire and discharge and has the person carry
oni business in its name, such person is an employee under the compensation act.-Judgmert affirmed.
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CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-FAILURE OF--TENDER-Richardson

vs. Jordar--No. 13290-Decided April 30, 1934--Opinion by

Mr. Justice Butter.
Jordan recovered judgment below for $110.09. Defendants borrowed $3,500 from Jordan to be used in building a house and received
their promissory note payable in three years with six per cent interest
and the note was secured by deed of trust on the property. Jordan, to
protect his trust deed against liens for labor and materials, was permitted to pay the construction bills out of the money loaned, and before the building was completed Jordan informed the defendants that
there were more bills coming in than he anticipated and thiey would
have to pay an additional 3 per cent on the loan or he wouldn't go
ahead with the deal. They refused and Jordan paid out $5.09 in
excess of the $3,500 loan and recovered below for the additional 3 per
cent commission.
1. There was no consideration for the promise of the defendants
to pay this additional 3 per cent whether it is considered as additional
commission or additional interest. The defendants got nothing more
than they already were lawfully entitled to and the plaintiff in doing
what he already was under obligation to do suffered no detriment.
2. The defendants had borrowed $3,500 and they were entitled
to have that amount paid to them or on their account. The refusal of
the plaintiff to perform his contract unless the defendants submitted to
his exaction, and his promise to perform it if they did, is indefensible
in law, and would not constitute a consideration which was necessary
to support the defendants' promise to pay the additional amount.
3. The amount of $5.09 being the overpayment by plaintiff the
defendants tendered into court and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
therefor.-Judgment reversed, with directions to enter judgment for
plaintiff for $5.09, but judgment for costs in favor of the defendants.
CONTRACTS-PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY

OF COMPLAINT-

Borland

vs. John F. Sass Printing Co.-No. 13248-Decided April 30,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Borland sued the company for $10,000 actual and $5,000 exemplary damages for breach of an alleged contract. He alleged that on
December 1, 1930, he bought twenty shares of stock in the company
at $100 per share under an agreement that he should be elected vicepresident and be employed at $35 a week so long as he should hold his
stock in the company. That thereafter he was elected vice-president
and so employed, but was later deposed as vice-president and his employment discontinued. A demurrer to the complaint for want of facts
was sustained below and Borland elected to stand.

1.

The alleged contract left Borland free to work for the com-

pany or not, as he might elect, and no definite limitation was fixed on
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the terms of employment. Such contracts are generally construed as
employment at will and may be terminated by either party.
2. The alleged contract surrendered to Borland, at his will and
for an unlimited time, the power and duty of stockholders or directors
to elect officers and select employees. The statutes and public policy
will not permit such a surrender.
3. Since Borland's alleged contract only provided for his office
and employment so long as he should hold his stock, and since the complaint fails to allege that at the date of any breach of said contract he
still held all his stock, or any part of it, the demurrer was good for this
reason if no other.-Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE COURTS -SUFFICIENCY
AMEND BOND-Smith vs.

OF APPEAL

BOND-RIGHT

TO

Elliott-No. 13515-Decided April
30, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Elliott sued Smith in justice court on a money demand for $30
and had judgment. Smith appealed to the County Court. There
Elliott appeared specially and moved to dismiss on the ground that the
appeal bond was insufficient. The motion was sustained and this ruling is assigned as error.
1. The appeal bond must be in a sum double the amount of the
judgment and costs.
2. The bond and the transcript of the justice are both before
this court and disclose the fact that the bond was not in the sum double
the amount of judgment and costs, and the bond was thus defective.
3. The judgment was entered on February 26 and Smith had
ten days from that date within which to file his bond and it was filed
on March 5 and the motion to dismiss was not heard until March 22,
but Smith made no application for leave to amend the bond or for any
additional time, and the appeal was properly dismissed.-Judgment
affirmed.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-MALPRACTICE--SETTLEMENT

UNDER

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AS A DEFENSE-Froid us.

Knowles-No. 12803-Decided April 30, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
An injured employee, having made settlement with his employer
under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, may maintain an action for malpractice against his own private physician who
treated his injury. The employee's replication, denying that the compensation received included anything on account of the injuries claimed
to have been suffered through the physician's malpractice and alleging
that no contractual relation or privity existed between the physician
and the employer, is not demurrable.--Judgment reversed with direc-
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tions to overrule the demurrer. Mr. Chief Justice Adams, Mr. Justice
Campbell and Mr. Justice Bouch dissent.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

-

WRIT OF PROHIBITION

-

PARTIES-

LACHES--James et al. vs. James-No. 11375-Decided April 30,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. The trial court, which is sought to be restrained, and the
judge thereof, are necessary parties in an application to the Supreme
Court for issuance of a writ of prohibition.
2. The Supreme Court will not entertain an application for a
writ of prohibition where there has been a delay of three years and nine
months between the date of the orders complained of and the date of
application for the writ, particularly where, during said period of time,
hearings had been held by a referee, whose appointment was one of the
matters of which complaint was made.-On petition for rehearing.
Rehearing denied. .
REAL PROPERTY-TRANSFER OF--SUIT TO SET ASIDE-BURDEN OF
PROOF-PRIMA FACIE CASE-Armstrong vs. Fischbach et al.No. 13329-Decided April 30, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1. Suit to set aside the transfer of land from defendant Fischbach, who was the mother, to defendant Strauss, the daughter. Plaintiff was a judgment creditor of the former. The allegations of the complaint, supported by plaintiff's testimony, tended to prove that the
conveyance to the daughter was for the sole purpose of enabling a loan
to be placed upon the property, and "that the only consideration for
the making of the deed was the agreement by, Mrs. Strauss to maintain
and support her mother during the term of her natural life." At the
close of plaintiff's case the court sustained a motion for nonsuit.
2. A conveyance from mother to daughter is viewed in the same
light as a conveyance from husband to wife. The burden of proving
consideration is upon the grantor and grantee when the conveyance is
questioned by a creditor.-Judgmentreversed.
REAL PROPERTY -LEASES-CONTEMPLATION
OF PARTIES -J.
C.
Penney Conpany vs. Birrell-No. 13296-Decided April 30,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. Plaintiff company was lessee and defendant Birrell sub-lessee
of certain storeroom premises. Defendant operated a grocery store in
the back of the same room in which the plaintiff operated its store.
Shortly after the execution of the lease, plaintiff made plans to construct
a partition separating the two establishments. Immediately upon learn-
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ing of plaintiff's plans, defendant objected, by letter. The plans contemplated that customers desiring to trade with defendant would be
compelled to use a side door on a side street. Defendant refused to pay
rent and plaintiff threatened to oust him; thereafter defendant paid
under protest. Suit was instituted for unpaid rent of four months,
during which time defendant occupied the premises and later a supplemental complaint was filed on the balance of the lease. From judgment for the defendant, plaintiff prosecutes error.
2. The suit was tried on the theory of constructive eviction.
The question was whether or not the plaintiff justified the abandonment of the lease by the defendant. A rational person would not enter
into a lease which would, by its terms, deprive him of the most valuable and substantial advantages of his established business location,
namely, the entrance to his store.-Judgnent affirmed.
ESTOPPEL

-

SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING

-

SUFFICIENCY OF Evi-

DENCE-The Lamar Building and Loan Association vs. Truax
et al.-No. 13263-Decided May 7, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
1. Answer, pleading payment, but in the course of pleading payment setting up certain matters of estoppel, held insufficient to support
plea of estoppel, when objection was made to the introduction of evidence supporting a plea of estoppel.
2. Estoppel is a separate defense and must be separately pleaded.
3. A plea of estoppel, that fails to allege that the representations
were made by the plaintiff with the intention that they should be acted
upon, is insufficient.--Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Butter, Mr. Jus-

tice Campbell and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
MANDAMUS-PROBATIONAL APPOINTMENT OF POLICE OFFICERDENVER CHARTER-Milliken et al. vs. Zarnow-No. 13021-

Decided May 7, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Under Sec. 234 of Article XV of the charter of the City and
County of Denver, which provided for probational appointment in the
classified service for a period of six months, the manager of safety can
discharge a police officer without preferring charges and without a hearing at end of probationary term.
2. This is a discretionary right in the manager of safety and is
not subject to review by the Civil Service Commission.
3. A writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the manager of
safety to appoint relator as a permanent police officer.-Judgment re-

versed with instructions to dismiss unit. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting.

272

DICTA

DIVORCE-SUPPORT OF CHILD-POWER TO MODIFY IN ABSENCE OF
APPLICATION FOR-Duval vs. Duval-No. 13514-Decided

May 7, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Where a judgment is entered for support of child, the court is
without power, in an absence of an application therefor, to modify
the order relative to the sum, the form of judgment, the time of payment or the manner of credit of money to be paid by defendant.
2. Even where application is made for modification, it must rest
on changed circumstances of the parties.--Judgmentreversed.
CONTRACTS - QUANTUM MERUIT - DISTINCTION BETWEEN IN
CLAIMS FILED AGAINST ESTATE-Rishel, as Administratrix vs.

Crawford-No. 13501-Decided May 7, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.

Crawford filed claim in County Court for services rendered to deceased and claim was disallowed and upon appeal a jury brought in a
verdict in his favor for $1,500.
1. No formal pleadings are required in exhibiting claims against
estate and the distinction between actions on specific contract and quantum meruit is often impossible.
2. The instruction that the jury could find the reasonable worth
of his services in lieu of a specific agreement for salary was not errone-

ous.-Judgment affirmed.
AGENCY-PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF ANSWER-The

ColoradoIn-

vestment and Realty Co. vs. Newkirk-No. 13252-Decided
May 7, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Newkirk filed her complaint below, alleging in substance that she
purchased a 1500/6700 interest in a loan and received a certificate from
defendant so stating and that the certificate provided that interest was
to be collected without charge, but in case of default, defendant could
either purchase the interest back or foreclose. Defendant foreclosed
and for lack of bidders, bought in the property and plaintiff prayed
for judgment for the amount of her certificate.
Defendant answered that the certificate constituted it the agent of
plaintiff and that it foreclosed as such agent and offered to deed to plaintiff a 1500/6700 interest in the property. A demurrer to answer was
sustained and plaintiff had judgment for the full amount of the certificate.

1. The certificate created a general agency in the defendant.
2. Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, an authority to
collect will usually carry with it power to employ counsel or appear as
attorney and bring suit to enforce payment.
3. The answer stated a defense and demurrer should have been
overruled.--Judgment reversed with leave to reply and for further proceedings.
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EQUITY-PLEADING--SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-TRUSTEE NOT
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST--Gates vs. Hepp-No. 13260-De-

cided May 7, 1934--Opinion by, Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. Where complaint shows that plaintiff's sole interest was that
of trustee and that the beneficiaries have been made parties as intervenors, such beneficiaries, being parties and being the real parties in interest,
superseded the trustee, and where such beneficiaries did not object to a
dismissal, after a demurrer to complain was sustained and there was an
election to stand upon the complaint, and where they assign no error,
judgment of dismissal cannot be attacked by the trustee alone.
2. In a suit for specific performance, there must be both allegations and proof that plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy
at law. Where the complaint shows no loss suffered by plaintiff or that
an action for damages would not be entirely adequate if there was loss,
the complaint is insufficient.--Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
JUDGMENTS---SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT-DISCRETION OF COURT-

Locke vs. Berkins-No. 13509-Decided May 21, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where judgment has been entered by default, granting or
denying of the petition to set aside the default and vacate the judgment
is discretionary with the trial court and such ruling will not be interfered with unless it appears that there has been an abuse of discretion.
2. Where a defendant has had the opportunity of reading the
complaint and permits a judgment to be taken by default and then
waits five months after the service of summons and copy of the complaint and nearly three months after the signing of the decree before
petitioning the court to vacate a default of judgment entered thereon,
this court cannot find that the discretion of the trial court in denying
the petition was guilty of an abuse of discretion.--Judgment affirmed.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE--SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT--STATUTE
OF FRAUDS--SUFFICIENCY OF CONTRACT--Gage vs. Young et

al.-No. 13507-Decided May 21, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Question of whether letters alleged to constitute a contract for
the sale of land are sufficie-nt to comply with the statute of frauds cannot be raised by a general demurrer. Such question must be raised by
a special demurrer.
2. Where specific performance is sought on the contract, which
contract must be determined from letters and telegrams passing between
the parties, and where it appears from the letters and telegrams that the
negotiations were still in a preliminary stage and that the minds of the
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parties had not met on the question of the reservation of leases for
crops, the writings did not constitute a completed contract.
3. Where a contract is sought to be established from a series of
letters and telegrams, the court will scrutinize the correspondence
closely to determine whether the correspondence constitutes a completed
contract or whether or not merely preliminary negotiations.--Judgment sustained, demurrer to complaint and dismissing actions affirmed.
GARNISHMENT-DISPOSITION

OF PROMISSORY

NOTE

UNDER-The

Union Deposit Co. et a[. vs. Driscoll et al.-No. 13535-Decided
May 21, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This was a proceeding to determine whether in a given judgment,
a promissory note, impounded through garnishment, should be credited on the judgment at its face. To a judgment denying credit of the
face of the note and directing the garnishee to deliver the note to the
sheriff to be disposed of in the manner required by law, the judgment
debtor assigns error.
1. Where a promissory note is impounded by garnishment proceedings and on the trial of a traverse there was no issue as to the value
of the note or as to how it should be applied, and the judgment in the
traverse trial was that the note should continue with the garnishee, until
the cause was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court, and when that
judgment was affirmed, the note inured to the benefit of the judgment
creditor but not in any arbitrary amount, such as the face of the note.
2. In such case there was a proper order to have the sheriff take
possession of the note.
3. It further found that the order to make disposition of the note
in the manner required by law was a proper order.--Judgmentaffirmed.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-NUISANCE

ON PRIVATE

PROPERTY-

LIABILITY OF CITY-The City and County of Denver vs. Ristau
-No. 13208-Decided May 21, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Fred Ristau and wife, joint owners of real estate, brought this
action against the city and some of its officers for damages for failure to
abate a nuisance arising from a dump near their property and recovered verdict for $500.
1. The abatement of a nuisance is a part of the governmental
power of a municipality.
2. It is solely discretionary and is not bound to exercise such
power.
3. The city is not liable for failure to abate a nuisance unless it
is created by it or is on its own property or is in itself a breach of a duty

DICTA

275

tmposed upon the city, as where it renders a public highway unsafe
and the like.
4. Where the ordinance designates the power to abate a nuisance
to a particular officer, but the ordinance does not provide the method of
abatement, the method is left to the discretion of such officer and he
had the power to decide how it should be done, and when the evidence
shows that he did so decide and a reasonable effort was made to remedy
the trouble and prevent the nuisance, the city is not liable for unsuccessful attempts or failure in this governmental function.--Judgment
retersed.
Otis Elevator Co. vs. Maryland Casualty Co.-No. 13012-Decided
May 21, 193 4--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Maryland Casualty Co. obtained a judgment against the Otis
Elevator Co. for $52,253.86, based on the following:
The Otis Elevator Co. installed an elevator in a building at Casper, Wyoming, and after installation contracted to repair, inspect, examine, grease and lubricate the elevator twice each month and keep it in
a safe condition for use as a passenger elevator. The elevator while
loaded with passengers fell down the elevator shaft due to the hoisting
cables pulling out from the top of the elevator on account of being
negligently installed.
The injured passengers recovered judgment against the building
which was in turn satisfied by the Maryland Casualty Co. as insurer,
and this suit was brought to recover the judgments paid, settlements
made and all expenses in defending the suit, including attorneys' fees.
1. The contract between the Otis Elevator Co. and the building,
whereby the Otis Elevator Co. sought to exonerate itself from all liability for its negligence, was void as against public property.
2. The public was concerned with such of its citizens as would
use the elevator, and the public had a right to expect and demand that
the elevator as a carrier of the public would be kept safe for its use and
it was the business of the Otis Elevator Co., by its contract, to inspect
and repair the elevator, and the law will not permit it to escape liability
for its negligence by a contract between it and the owner of the building, exempting it from negligence.
3. Such contracts do not change the law of public liability.
Variance between the pleadings and proof is waived where no objection
is made to the introduction of the evidence on the ground of variance.
4. This is an action in assumpsit for moneys paid for Otis Elevator Co. in its stead, and after notice and demand upon it to defend the
suits which it refused to do. These suits established negligence and
resulting damage on the part of Otis Elevator Co., responded to by the
owner of the building and the insurer, and the judgments became conclusive on Otis Co. except as to its liability to establish that the negli-
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gence which caused the accident was the action or primary negligence of
the building owner.
5. Otis Elevator Co. cannot escape liability on the theory of
mutual negligence as between it and the building owner by the claim
of failure on the part of the building owner to inspect the elevator, for
the reason that such failure would have resulted in no damage, without
a primary cause, and the primary cause was the negligence of the Otis
Co. in failing to install the hoisting cables in a careful manner.
6. The rule that relieves one joint tort feasor from contribution
to the other is applied only where the tort feasors acted in concert in
committing the negligence or wrongful act. The contrary was the case
here.
7. Where one is obliged to defend against the act of another
against whom he has a remedy over, he may if such other has notice of
the suit and an opportunity to defend, hold him liable for the amount
of damages recovered against himself and which he is compelled to pay,
together with interest thereon, expenses and attorneys' fees in defending
the actions.-Judgmentaffirmed.

DAMAGES - Kitrelt et at. vs.
RESCISSION - FRAUDGates et a.-No. 13269-Decided May 21, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Writ of error prosecuted by Kitrell, one of the defendants, to reverse a joint and several judgment against all defendants. The action
was based on fraudulent representations in inducing the defendants to
trade their farm and building and loan stock for stock in Paramount
Life Co., which alleged representations were that Paramount Life Co.
was a life insurance company and was entitled to do business as such
and had assets of approximately one million dollars.
The defendants had two corporations, one Paramount Life Co.,
which was not authorized as a life insurance company, and another
corporation of similar name called Paramount Life Insurance Co., the
latter being authorized as an insurance company, and the defendants
made the trade for stock in Paramount Life Co. on the representation
that it was an insurance company. The evidence showed that Paramount Life Co. never had a license to write life insurance.
1. Where a complaint alleges tort and asks for body judgment
and at the same time asks for a rescission of the contract, the complaint
does not contain two improperly united causes of action. What the
complaint really states is a cause of action for rescission founded upon
a tort and it is not an action in tort.
2. The evidence fully sustains the judgment below for rescission
and damages.-Judgmentaffirmed.
CONTRACTS -
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CORPORATIONS

COMPLIANCE
TRACT-The

-

LIABILITY

To

WITH CHARTER PROVISIONS

ARCHITECT IN LETTING

NONCON-

City and County of Denver vs. Moorman as Administratrix-No. 13125-Decided May 21, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Action for value of architect's services rendered by the defendant
in error's decedent in the matter of the construction of certain public
buildings by the City of Denver. Plaintiff had judgment below for
$3,501.50 on quantum meruit.
1. The charter of the City and County of Denver provides that
on contracts for local improvements and all other contracts involving
the expenditures under the board, shall be let by the mayor, upon recommendation of the board. All such contracts shall be let to the lowest reliable and responsible bidder after public advertisement by the
board for not less than ten days. Any other mode of letting such
contracts shall be illegal and void.
2. Such charter provisions must be complied with with reference
to services rendered the city by architects, and any contract for such
services to be legal must be made in compliance therewith.
3. Where such contract is left to the architect without any bids
being taken or any advertisement, such contract is not enforceable.
4. Where there is a failure to comply with such charter provision the architect cannot recover for his services on the quantum meruit.
-- Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. Mr.
Justice Bouch dissenting. Mr. Justice Butler concurring but not agreeing with the reasoning as being sound, but this occurrence being based
on the decision in the Johnson-Olmsted Realty Co. vs. City and County
of Denver, 89 Colo. 240, on which he tiled his dissenting opinion.

REAL PROPERTY-MORTGAGES-:FORECLOSURE-RECEIVERS--AP-

WHEN-Denver Joint Stock Land Bank vs. Newton
et al.-No. 13522-Decided May 28, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
1. The parties appear as below. The bank held a trust deed
against property owned by defendant. No taxes had been paid for
several years and insurance premiums had not been, paid. After sale, the
bank applied for the appointment of a receiver and a lien on rents and
profits for the payment of insurance and taxes, under the terms of its
contract. The bank made this application as purchaser at the sale.
The application was denied by the trial court and the bank alleged
error.
2. Prior to 1929 receivership matters were largely discretionary.
Chapter 151, S. L. 1929, is for the protection of purchasers at foreclosure sales. Under the act it was defendant's duty to "pay current
POINTED
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taxes before a penalty accrues" and "to keep the premises insured."
Under the facts here, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse the appointment of a receiver.--Judgmentreversed and remanded.
Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck:
The granting or denying of receiverships are within the sound discretion of the court. No abuse of that discretion was here shown. The
judgment should be affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES--INSURANCE

ON CONTENTS-MEANING OF PHRASE

"LEFT UNATTENDED"-Atterbury vs. National Union Fire InsuranceCo.-No. 1318 1-Decided March 19, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Insurance Company issued to plaintiff the policy of insurance in
the sum of $1,500.00 on plaintiff's violin to cover its loss by fire, theft
or burglarly. The policy contained a clause that the insurance would
not apply to property in automobiles while such automobiles were left
unattended, nor should there be liability for loss caused by dishonesty
of any attendant or attendants. The plaintiff left the violin in his
automobile parked in the street with automobile locked. The plaintiff
alleged that he told the insurance company's agent that he desired a
policy insuring the violin regardless of whether the car was attended
and that he read the policy and the agent informed him that if the car
was locked that the car would be attended. Demurrer was filed to this
last allegation and sustained and defendant's motion for judgment on
the pleadings was sustained.
1. Where the insurance policy contains a clause that no official,
agent or other representative shall have power to waive any provision
unless the waiver shall be written upon or attached to the policy, and
the insured accepts and reads the policy, the insurer is not bound by
the verbal waiver of its agent.
2. It is only where the act of the agent is within the apparent
scope of authority and the insured is not aware of any limitation thereon, that the insurer is bound.
3. Section 2528, Compiled Laws of 1921, specifically provides
that an insurance company shall not make any contract of insurance
other than is plainly explained in the policy.
4. In this case the policy provides the only means by which its
contractual terms can be altered and if the same were allowed to be
changed, by parol evidence, then plain words in insurance contracts
would have little value and all would rest upon the disputes to arise
after a loss.
5. The words in the policy providing that the insurance would
not apply to property in automobiles while such automobiles are left
unattended mean some form of animated attendance, and merely locking the automobile does not come within such term of the policy.Judgment affirmed.

